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Preface
　 It has been argued that it is more difficult to amend the Japanese Constitution 
than the U.S. Constitution.  To effect a recent change in the Japanese Constitution, 
on July 1, 2014, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo announced a modification of the 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution by way of a cabinet decision.  Other 
imminent plans to revise the Constitution are Abe’s planned amendments to revise 
sections related to defense powers in 2015.
　 Using a comparative law approach, this article examines these two efforts to 
revise the Japanese Constitution in a broad review of whether now is the time to 
amend the Constitution.
　 It is said that the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution is too complicated 
for the general public to understand.  A Japanese Constitutional scholar’s duty is 
to solve this difficult question and bridge the gap between ordinary life and texts 
of legal statutes, and the Japanese Constitution.
I:  Article 9
1.  The Sunagawa Case
　 The current Japanese government was established after WWII, its new 
Constitution having been promulgated in November 1946, and taking effect in 
March 1947.  Sixty-eight years have passed; seventy, since the Japanese 
government accepted the Potsdam Declaration in 1945.1  This section reviews the 
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 1. Hideo Tanaka, “A History of the Constitution of Japan of 1946.” In The Japanese Legal 
System, edited by Hideo Tanaka and Malcolm Smith (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1976), 
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issues regarding the article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
　 Article 9 in Chapter 2 states:
“[a]spiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.  In order to 
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained. the right of belligerency of the state 
will not be recognized.”
　 In this context, the Japanese Supreme Court has often dealt with the question 
of the Constitutionality of the use and existence of military forces for self-defense. 
The Court has not provided a clear answer to the question, which has led to 
controversies among the general public and Constitutional researchers.
　 The Sunagawa case2 addressed the security3 treaty concluded between Japan 
and the U.S. in September 1951, providing the foundation for the Abe 
administration’s endorsement of a collective self-defense force4 on 1 July, 2014. 
In this case, the Japanese Supreme Court reviewed the treaty and held that the 
foreign forces stationed in Japan did not constitute an “army,” as prohibited in 
Article 9.  Only the forces managed by Japanese government constituted an 
“army” prohibited under that Constitutional article.
　 In the Sunagawa case, the government began a survey of the property of 
Tachikawa airport in July 1957 for the purposes of constructing the U.S. armed 
forces base at that site.  A critical public objected to the base construction, and 
protested near the fence on the property of the airport.  After a while, the shouting, 
demonstrating groups wrecked the fence, and trespassed on the property within an 
area of several tens of meters.  They were arrested and prosecuted under the Law 
for Special Measures Concerning Criminal Cases to Implement the Administrative 
Agreement under Article III of the security treaty.
　 The defendants claimed that the prosecution contravened Article 315 of the 
653.
  “1―6 Records of Negotiations Related to the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration,” 
The Birth of the Constitution of Japan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/010shoshi.
html (accessed March 29, 2015).
 2. Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Dec. 16, 1959, Showa 34(A) no. 710, 13 Saiko Saibansho 
Keiji Hanreishu [Keishu], 3225.
 3. Kyu Nihonkoku to Amerika Gasshukoku to no aidano anzen hoshou jouyaku [The Old 
Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S.] Japan-U.S., April 28, 1952, Treaty No. 6, 1952.
 4. “The right to use force to stop armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close 
relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack.” In The Japanese Legal System, 
edited by Curtis Milhaupt And Mark Ramseyer (New York: Foundation Press, 2012), 229.
 5. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 31 (Japan). No person shall be deprived 
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Japanese Constitution, and that the U.S. army forces stationed in Japan were 
unconstitutional under Article 9.
　 In March 1959, the Tokyo district court judge Date Akio held that the 
stationing of the U.S. armed forces could not be permitted, because it contravened 
paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.6
　 The prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court, bypassing the appeal court. 
Nearly eight months after the Tokyo district court decision, the Japanese Supreme 
Court held in December 1959 that Article 9 renounces “the so-called war and 
prohibits the maintenance of the so-called war potential, but certainly there is 
nothing in it which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a 
sovereign power.  The pacifism advocated in our Constitution was never intended 
to mean defenselessness or nonresistance.”
　 According to the Sunagawa decision, paragraph 2 of Article 9 did not “include 
foreign armed forces even if they are to be stationed in our country.”
　 The Japanese Supreme Court determined that the court could review the treaty 
between Japan and the other state, but avoided determining the Constitutionality 
of the treaty.  During this period, young Japanese citizens were concerned that the 
treaty would lead the Japanese government into unnecessary international 
disputes, which was clearly denounced in the preamble of the Japanese 
Constitution.
　 The Japanese Supreme Court said that in the formulation of the treaty, “the 
Cabinet of the Japanese Government then in power, negotiated with the United 
States on a number of occasions in accordance with the Constitutional provisions, 
and finally concluded the same as one of the most important national policies.  It 
is also a well-accepted public knowledge that...the question of whether the treaty 
was in accord with the Constitution was carefully discussed by both Houses and 
finally ratified by the Diet as being a legal and proper treaty.”
　 This is called Japanese “political question” which avoids judicial review the 
dispute with case and controversies.7
　 The Japanese Supreme Court held that Tokyo district court committed an error 
“when it ruled that Article 2 of the Special Criminal Law was unconstitutional and 
void, based on the assumption that the stationing of the US troops was illegal.” 
of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to 
procedure established by law.
 6. Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] March 30, 1959, Showa 34 (Tokuwa) no. 6, 
1952, 367, 368, 89 Hanrei Taimuz [Hanta] 79 (Japan).
 7. Political question is “decisions concerning a fundamental governmental action with a 
highly political character should not be made by the judiciary. Instead, the political branches of 
government, which are accountable to the people directly, or finally the people themselves 
should make these decision, even if ” the dispute has case and controversies. Taisuke Kamata. 
“Adjudication and the Governing Process.” In Japanese Constitutional Law (Tokyo: Tokyo 
University Press, 1993), 156―7.
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 37 / 201554
Accordingly, the Court vacated original decision and reversed.
　 The Abe administration views the Sunagawa case as endorsing the right of 
collective self-defense as sovereignty.  Asahi newspaper and Mainichi newspaper 
criticized the government in their editorials.8  Sankei and Nikkei newspapers are 
for amendment of Japanese Constitution.9
2.  Former (1981) Interpretation of the Defense Right
　 The Cabinet Legislation Bureau10 (CLB) (Naikaku Houseikyoku) has played a 
leading role in announcing public statement of Constitutional interpretation.  It 
established in 1952 as a branch of administration, has made a formal governmental 
announcement for the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution.  Before Abe’s 
cabinet decision in the summer of 2014, according to CLB’s explanation, the self-
defense power was divided into two powers, individual and collective defense 
powers per Article 51 of the United Nations Charter:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.11
　 Under this provision, the CBL maintained the position that the Japanese 
Constitution allowed only individual self-defense power, not collective.
　 Three conditions must be met to exercise self-defense power.  First, an 
immediate and imminent threat must occur; second, no alternative measure must 
exist; and third, the required minimum ability to use its self-defense power.
　 On December 5, 1980, asked from member of house of the representative, the 
Japanese government answered that Article 9 did not deny the self-defense power 
as a part of one independent sovereignty, and the government is allowed to 
 8. “Sunagawa Hanketsu no Gotugo Kaishaku” [Convenient interpretation of Sunagawa 
decision], The Asahi Shimbun, (April 6, 2014).
  “Shudanteki Jieiken, Konkyo naki Kenpo no Hakai” [Collective defense power, 
groundless destruction of Constitution], Mainichi Shinbun, (May 16, 2014).
 9. “Shshou ha doudou to igi wo katare” [Prime Minister should argue for the cause], 
Sankei Shinbun, (July 15, 2014).
  “Shudan anzen hoshou no giron wo soukyu ni susumeyo” [Discussion regarding 
collective security is needed], Nikkei Shinbun, (July 16, 2014).
 10. Naikaku Housei Kyoku [Cabinet Legislation Bureau], http://www.clb.go.jp/english/
index.html
 11. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nation.
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 37 / 2015 55
exercise necessary minimum ability to defend itself.12
　 On May 19, 1981, questioned from the member of the house of the 
representative, the government pronounced that the Japanese Constitution clearly 
denied the exercise of collective defense power, which was defined as the real 
ability to prevent attack by a foreign county upon a country with a close 
relationship with Japan, in case of no attack upon Japan.  The Japanese 
government announced that Japan had collective defense power, but could not 
exercise it.13  It did not, however, clearly define the substantive contents of 
collective defense power under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.14
　 The grounds for the government’s assertion were that exercising collective 
defense power was beyond the necessary minimum ability to defend, according to 
the CBL.  Collective defense power involves an attack upon a foreign nation that 
is allied with Japan.  It did not meet the second condition of illegal attack by a 
foreign nation upon Japan.
　 These announcements by the government shows inconsistency for 
interpretation of Article 9.15  The government made up explanations as a temporary 
measure.  Clearly, the Japanese government has publicly announced makeshift 
and inconsistent interpretations.  Behind this technical interpretation of Article 9, 
the Japanese government needed to justify a self-defense force during the Cold 
War between the Soviet Union and the U.S.
　 For example, on February 29, 1956, director Funada Naka of defense agency 
for Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro announced that the self-defense power 
included attacks against an enemy’s basement in the 1960 renewal of the Security 
Treaty between Japan and the U.S.16  He asserted that collective defense power 
was intended to use military force.
　 In 2004, the Director of the CBL announced that collective defense power 
related to the force of the ability to defend.
　 After Abe took back the reins of government in December 2012, he further 
changed the interpretation of Article 9.  In 2013, a private committee established 
by him considered several situations involving collective defense power.  This 
committee concluded that to attack a missile that flies to the U.S. over Japanese 
territory would be included in collective defense power; to support the U.S. 
marine ship was included in collective defense power; and to rescue foreign forces 
that worked together for Peace Keeping Operations required relaxation of the 
 12. Asano, Etl, Kenpo Tobenshu, (Shinzansha, 2003), 43.
 13. Id. At 98.
 14. Masahiro Sakata, Seihu No Kenpokaishaku, [Governmental Interpretation of 
Constitution] (Yuhikaku, 2013), 62.
 15. Id. At. 54―67.
 16. Nihonkoku to Amerika to no aida no sougo kyouryoku oyobi annzen hoshou jouyaku, 
[Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan] June 23, 
1960, Treaty No. 6, 1960.
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conditions on self-defense forces’ use of weapons.
　 In May 2014, this private committee submitted several proposals to the Abe 
administration, advising that amendment of existing statutes for defense was 
needed, to clarify the scope of collective power, and the approval of the Diet to 
send self-defense forces abroad.
　 The Japanese government established the National Security Council (NSC) in 
December 2013.  The National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense 
Program Guidelines (NDPG) were also adopted that month.
　 The legal basis for security was reconstructed in 2014.  The Abe administration 
justified a change in policies by noting the changes over time since the 
establishment of the Japanese Constitution in 1947.  When the Constitution was 
drafted, the ideal of creating the United Nations forces prevailed in society, and 
Japan was not expected to play an active role in regional global security.  In the 
21st century, however, Japanese government faced a rapidly changing global 
power balance, technological progress, and emerging threats.
　 In 2014, the Abe administration announced new three conditions to make 
defense power permissible under Article 9.  First, either an attack upon Japan must 
occur, or a nation in close relationship with Japan is attacked, the existence of the 
Japanese nation is endangered, and it’s clear that life, liberty, and the right to the 
pursuit of happiness is threatened.  Second, there must be no alternative measure 
to prevent attack and preserve the nation and protect its people.  Third, its exercise 
must meet the necessary minimum requirement.
3.  Constitutional Law Scholar’s Opinion
　 Abe’s Cabinet decision in 2014 surprised Japanese constitutional law scholars. 
Professor Hasebe Yasuo holds that the Japanese Constitution allows only 
individual defense-power, not collective defense power, to protect human life in 
the event of imminent danger.  The Japanese Constitution does not permit forcing 
people to have a certain point of view on how to live.  In comparison, the former 
government interpretation to allow only individual defense power is persuasive, 
objective, and based on medium-and long-term perspectives.17
　 According to Hasebe, it is true that Japanese people have various perspectives 
on keeping peace,18 and the Japanese government has denied collective defense 
power and trust in peace and safety by international society.
　 The new 2014 announcement allowing collective defense power lacks 
 17. Hasebe Yasuo, “Shudanteki Jieiken Kousi Younin ron no mondaiten” [The problems of 
endorsement of collective defense power], Jiyu to Seigi [Liberty and Justice], 8 (2014): 65―69.
 18. Hasebe Yasuo, Kenpo, [Constitution] (Shinseisha, 2011), 59―74. Hasebe Yasuo, Kenpo 
to Heiwa wo Toinaosu, [Question Again The Constituton and Peace] (Chikumashinsho, 2004), 
29―42.
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deliberated justification.
II:  Cabinet Decision under the Constitution
　 Under the Japanese Constitution, the Prime Minister has power to appoint and 
remove ministers from office by Article 68.19  Cabinet decisions need all the 
ministers’ approvals.  Article 6520 provides for executive power.  Under Japanese 
administrative powers, the inferior organizations, Cabinet Secretariat (CS), the 
CBL, and the National Personnel Authority support the Cabinet.  The CS provides 
direct support with the general and ordinary business of the Cabinet.  The CBL’s 
work is to review the bills to be drafted by the ministries.  The National Personnel 
Authority controls the performance rating and recruitment of human resources. 
The Director of the Cabinet Office is the Prime Minister, overseeing the other 
ministries.
　 The Director of the CBL is not a minister.  Abe appointed Komatsu Ichiro as 
Director of the CBL to change its public Constitutional interpretation of Article 9 
in August 2013.  The executives of this Bureau are recruited only from the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.  Komatsu Ichiro was the first director who 
was appointed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Prime Minister Abe.
　 Japanese newspapers refer to CBL as the keeper of the Constitution,21 although 
this is not entirely accurate.  The job of the Bureau is to review bills before 
submission and deliberation at the Diet;22 for this reason, a more correct 
description would be keeper of the government.23  The official announcement of 
interpretation from the CBL binds governmental discretion of interpretation, but 
Japanese constitutional law researchers should clarify that the final and supreme 
interpreter is not the CBL, but the Japanese Supreme Court.  The media’s 
description illustrates the need for Japanese constitutional law scholars to bridge 
the information gap between the Constitution and the general public.
 19. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 68 (Japan). The Prime Minister shall 
appoint the Ministers of State.
 20. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 65 (Japan). Executive power shall be 
vested in the Cabinet.
 21. “Houseikyoku Chokan” [Director of CBL, the keeper of the Constitution], The Asahi 
Shimbun, (March 14, 2014).
 22. Sakata Masahiro, Hou No Bannin, Naikaku Houseikyokuno Kyouji, [Keeper of 
Constitution] (Ohtsukishoten, 2014), 50.
 23. Supra note 14, at 2.
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1.  Change in Government Interpretation of Article 9 in 2014
　 In May 2014, the private committee for the reconstruction of legal basis for 
national security was summoned.  The committee, a private organization 
subsidized by CS, submitted its report to Prime Minister Abe.  This report started 
discussion by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Komeito party. 
The coalition government had a plan to submit a bill to the extraordinary session 
of the Diet in 2014.  Two ministers’ resignations24 prevented this schedule.  In 
March, the LDP and the Komeito party reached agreement to legislate to send 
self-defense forces overseas with no time limit.
　 Some Constitutional law researchers25 criticized the cabinet decision of 2014. 
Suga Yoshihide, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, explained that the bill would be 
deliberated in the session of the Diet.  In parliamentary system, the Diet and the 
Cabinet are required to work together to deliberate and pass the bill.  No bill 
existed in time of the cabinet decision in 2014, however.  Only facts were piled 
up.  In 2015, the relevant bills are planned to be submitted in the session of the 
Diet.
2.  The Problem of the Cabinet Decision
　 In reaching its decision in 2014, the Cabinet exercised its power to maintain 
Constitutionality of the bill by using the CBL.  Professor Arikawa Tsunemasa26 
points out that the bill did not exist in 2014, when the Cabinet undertook to 
explain its decision to the Diet, the highest organ of state power, under Article 
41.27  He noted that the public announcement by the Cabinet ignored the 
deliberations on the issue that occurred in committee or in the Diet.
　 Hasebe28 also criticized the CBL, arguing that it should maintain a mid-and 
long-term perspective of governmental policy, independent of the Cabinet from 
time to time.  Though its Director is appointed by the Prime Minister, this does 
not mean that that the Director needs to follow the political command of the Prime 
Minister.  Moreover, even if such appointment follows the Prime Minister, the 
justices of the Japanese Supreme Court are not necessarily under the chain of 
command of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
 24. Matsushima Midori resigned ministry of Justice. Obuchi Yuko resigned the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry in October 2014.
 25. Supra note 17.
 26. Arikawa Tsunemasa, “Kenpo Kaishaku Kenryoku” [The Power of Interpretation of 
Constitution], HourituJihou, 6 (2014): 86―88.
 27. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 41 (Japan). The Diet shall be the highest 
organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.
 28. Supra note 17.
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　 In 2013, former CBL Director Yamamoto Tsuneyuki29 criticized his successor 
Komatsu Ichiro’s change of government interpretation of Article 9 when he was 
appointed Justice of the Supreme Court by Article 79.30  The CBL monitors bills 
prepared by the ministries of the Cabinet, and if a bill fails review, it only means 
that it cannot be submitted to the Diet.  Yamamoto said that Article 9 does not 
permit a collective defense force, and that a Constitutional amendment would be 
required, to be judged by the Japanese people.
　 Hasebe and Arikawa31 both foresaw in 2014 that the Cabinet decision without 
any bill would accelerate the revision of relevant statutes around Article 9 in 2015, 
and its importance, drastic change of national policy would lacked the legitimacy 
of democracy.
　 The Abe administration had used the new term “proactive contributor to 
peace.”  These professors were of the opinion that this notion of peace was too 
speculative and subjective, compared to the pre―2014 government announcement 
of the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution.
III:  Article 96
1.  Article 96 and the National Referendum Act for Amendment of the Japanese 
Constitution
　 The Japanese Constitution has been referred to as a rigid Constitution.  Similar 
to the U.S. Constitution, which is the oldest written Constitution, Japan’s is also 
written.
　 Article 96 of Chapter 9 of the Japanese Constitution states:
“[a]mendments to this constitution shall be initiated by the diet, through a concurring 
vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each house and shall thereupon be 
submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a 
majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the 
diet shall specify.  Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated 
by the emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this constitution.”
　 The Japanese Diet consists of two branches: the House of Representative and 
the House of Councilors.  Article 96 requires a two-thirds concurring vote in each 
House for passing a referendum.  According to the National Referendum Act for 
 29. Nikkei Shinbun [Nikkei newspaper] August 20, 2013.
 30. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 79 (Japan). Article 79. The Supreme 
Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; 
all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet.
 31. Supra note 26.
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Amendment of the Japanese Constitution,32 an amendment bill may be submitted 
by each House.  The submission of a proposal requires the approval of one 
hundred members in the House of Representatives.  A proposal by the House of 
Councilors needs the approval of fifty members.33
　 Such proposal is then referred to a constitutional examination board, requiring 
majority approval.  After the examination board passes the bill, it is returned to the 
House of Representatives and the House of Councilors.  Each House then requires 
a two-thirds concurring vote.  After this, the bill is sent to the Japanese people as a 
referendum.
　 For 60 to 180 days, the amendment bill is publicized by newspapers and 
television.34  The eligible age for referendum voting will be eighteen years old in 
2018.  Voters mark approval or denial and submit their ballot in secrecy.  The 
emperor then publicly announces amendment of the Japanese Constitution, if the 
Japanese people have approved by a majority.
　 Professors Ashibe Nobuyoshi35 argues that the ruler and the ruled should be 
consistent with each other.  The Japanese people deliberate and consider in the 
interest of minors and future generations.  In the name of sovereignty of the 
people, it is the people who need to carve out their destiny, take responsibility, and 
accept their decision.  Even though it might be wrong in the long run, this 
guarantees the legitimacy of the democracy.
　 In 2015, the total number of seats in the House of Representatives is 475; 242, 
in the House of Councilors.  The outcome of the lower house election on 
December 14, 2014 revealed that the LDP and its junior ruling coalition partner 
Komeito Party maintained their seats, winning 326 seats out of a total of 475 in 
the House of Representatives.
2.  Amendment Proposal of the U.S. Constitution and the Role of Elections
　 Article 5 of the U.S. Constitution provides for Constitutional amendments.  It 
requires a two-thirds vote in favor, in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.  At the request of two-thirds of the states, a convention to propose 
amendments is called.
　 In the past, state legislatures proposed a bill to amend the Constitution to 
restrict federal income tax, for example, but the proposal not accepted by the U.S. 
Congress.  The power of state legislatures is only to call the proposal for 
 32. Nihonkoku Kenpou no Kaisei tetuduki ni kansuru houritu [the National Referendum 
Act for Amendment of the Japanese Constitution] Art. 1.
 33. Kokkai hou [The Diet Act] Art. 68―2.
 34. Nihonkoku Kenpou no Kaisei tetuduki ni kansuru houritu [the National Referendum 
Act for Amendment of the Japanese Constitution] Art. 2.
 35. Ashibe Nobuyoshi, Kenpo, [Constitution] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011), 346.
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amendment to the Congress, not to pass the amendment itself, as the federal 
legislature is not subject to state legislatures.
　 States must then ratify the proposal submitted by the Congress, through one of 
two means: ratification by state legislature or by convention.  The Congress can 
also add a supplementary resolution that states are required to ratify within a 
reasonable period.
　 Compared with the Japanese Constitution, there are both differences and 
common aspects.  One might not say that the U.S. Constitution is more easily 
amended, in consideration of the following.
　 For one thing, amendment of the Japanese Constitution does not involve the 
forty-seven prefectures.  The Japanese Constitution does not have federalism 
system; Chapter 8 provided for autonomy of the local governments.  Article 9536 
allows the prefectures to pass statutes to govern within their own borders.
　 Second, members of the U.S. state legislatures are elected before ratification. 
The Representatives do not go through the election process specifically to address 
the issue of ratification.  In other words, they are not chosen by the voters with 
regard to a specific constitutional amendment.
　 Under the Japanese Constitution, there is dissolution of the House of 
Representatives under the parliamentary system.  Japanese constitutional 
researchers hold that it is necessary to dissolve the Diet to ask the will of the 
people in cases where the issues were not reviewed by the people when the 
representatives were elected.
　 There is no provision regarding dissolution ordered by the Cabinet in the 
Japanese Constitution.  By using Article 737 for the formal and ritual conduct of 
the Emperor and Tomabechi case, the Cabinet dissolved the parliament without a 
parliamentary motion of non-confidence against the Cabinet, as provided in 
Article 69.38
　 In contrast, the U.S. has a presidential system and no dissolution of the 
Congress.
　 Japanese constitutional researchers are of the opinion that the essence of the 
parliamentary system is that the cabinet owes responsibility to the Diet, which is 
selected by the people directly.  Unlike the U.S. presidential system, which allows 
 36. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 95 (Japan). A special law, applicable 
only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the 
majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.
 37. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 7 (Japan). The Emperor, with the advice 
and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of 
the people: 3) Dissolution of the House of Representatives.
 38. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 69 (Japan). If the House of 
Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the 
Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten 
days.
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the Congress to conflict with the President, the Japanese legislature and the 
executive power are required to work together to reflect the will of the people. 
This is called that the nature of the parliamentary system is accountability from 
the government to the Diet.
　 Constitutional law researchers also note that there is a limit to the Article 7 
power of dissolution by the Cabinet.  First, the important bill submitted by the 
Cabinet is not passed in the parliament, or the Cabinet shelves the bill.  Second, 
the fundamental nature of the Cabinet is changed by political realignment.  Third, 
there is a need to deal with new important issues that have not arisen in the 
general elections.  Fourth, the Cabinet changes its fundamental policy drastically. 
Fifth, the term of members of the House of Representatives is nearly complete in 
which case arbitrary dissolution is prohibited.
3.  Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
　 There are twenty-seven amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the last one 
occurring 203 years after the Constitution’s signing.  The number of amendment 
propositions by the Congress has been thirty-three.  Two important propositions to 
amend the Constitution failed: the prohibition of child labor in 1924; and the equal 
protection amendment in 1982.
　 Professor Kawashima Masaki39 explains that amendment for equal protection 
proposals acquired two-thirds in Congress in 1972, and the referendum proceeding 
went well, but did not obtain the requisite three-fourths.  In 1982, the amendment 
proposal failed.  In spite of this failure, the U.S. established gender equality 
through the affirmative action movement.  Kawashima believes that this failure 
cultivated among American citizens a dialogue on gender equality.
4.  Role of the President with Regard to the U.S. Constitution
　 There is no provision for Presidential veto during the process of U.S. 
Constitutional amendment; the President is excluded from the procedure, as the 
amendment process belongs to federal and state legislatures.  Moreover, the 
President is prohibited from submitting a Constitutional amendment bill to the 
Congress.
　 Japan’s parliamentary system provides that the Prime Minster is eligible to 
submit an amending bill to the parliament under Article 72.40  The Prime Minister 
 39. Kawashima Masaki, Afamative Akushon no Yukue [A History of Affirmative Action in 
The USA] (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2014), 90, 161.
 40. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 72 (Japan). The prime minister, 
representing the cabinet, submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations 
to the diet and exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches.
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is the head of the ruling party.  The greater number of the ministries must be 
members of the Diet, according to Article 68.41
　 Article 41 provides that the Diet is the sole and the highest government organ. 
The bills are submitted by members of the Diet and the ministries.  The Diet 
deliberates freely to amend or abolish the bill.  Hence, the grounds for the 
criticism of Hasebe and Arikawa that the cabinet decision in 2014 ignores 
deliberation in the parliament.
IV:  Limits of the Amendment
1.  Limits of Amendment of the Japanese Constitution and Article 41 and the 2014 
Cabinet Decision
　 This section reviews whether the Japanese people can amend their Constitution 
to abolish its three basic principles: people’s sovereignty, list of the fundamental 
rights, and pacifism.  The governmental position isn’t clear in this issue.42
　 The people’s sovereignty has three meanings: the power of the government 
itself; the supreme and independent power; and the authority and power to decide 
national politics.
　 Parliament has the authority to pass statutes.  The term “sole law-making 
organ” in Article 41 is understood to mean that the text of the statute is applied 
equally, generally to the people and cases.  Referendums of the people are not 
allowed in passing statutes because this conflicts with the term “sole.”  The 
parliament may use a referendum for information in decision making, if it has no 
legal power to bind the Diet decision.
　 The term “highest” in Article 41 means that the Diet consists of members 
democratically selected by voters and is the central organ in passing statutes, 
independent of other organs.
　 The Cabinet decision of 2014 had the effect of reducing parliamentary 
democracy in name only.
2.  Amendment Proposal for Article 100 by the LDP
　 Article 96 requires a two-thirds approval vote of the House of Representative 
and the House of Councilors to amend the Japanese Constitution.  According to 
Professor Higuchi Youichi, most Prime Ministers, who were also the heads of the 
LDP, did not put proposals for the Constitution on their political agenda, until the 
 41. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 68 (Japan). The prime minister shall 
appoint the ministers of state. however, a majority of their number must be chosen from among 
the members of the diet. The prime minister may remove the ministers of state as he chooses.
 42. Supra note 14, at 308.
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Party was defeated by election in 1993.
　 In April 2012, the LDP proposed an amendment to Article 96 to reduce the 
number of approvals, while it was out of power.
“Article 100. 1 Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the members of 
the House of Representatives or the House of Councilors and resolved by the Diet, 
through a concurring vote of majority of all the members of each House, and shall 
thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require approval of 
a majority of valid votes by referendum, as provided by law. 2. Amendments to this 
Constitution when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor.”
　 The LDP was established in 1955, and its leader Hatoyama Ichiro delivered the 
keynote address as Prime Minister, stating that part of the LDP’s agenda was to 
amend the Constitution.  This 55 Years political system was a two-party system of 
government led by the LDP, with the Socialist Party in opposition, since 1955.
　 In 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida Sigeru ordered the CBL to consider the issues 
of amendments of Japanese Constitution; Kishi Nobusuke led the investigating 
committee.  Kishi argued in parliament that Japan needed to establish its own 
Constitution.
　 In 1985, the LDP announced its political platform, and tried unsuccessfully to 
remove the term “Amendment of Japanese Constitution” from its agenda.
　 In 2005 and 2012, the LDP’s proposals for amendment emphasized that the 
Japanese national identity should be reflected (i.e., proclaiming the emperor as 
head of state, and addition of the duty of the people to respect the national flag 
and song).  The protection of fundamental rights were respected only if it 
infringed the public interests and public order.  The term Article 9743 was deleted 
in the draft by the LDP.
3.  Natural Law and Legal Positivism
　 In Japan, there are two camps of thought, for and against limits on Japanese 
Constitution amendments.  The advocates against limits view the almighty 
constituent power which is original creator of the Constitution, and the power to 
amend Constitution as the same.  Every provision of the Japanese Constitution has 
the same effectiveness̶one amendment provision is the same as others.  The 
Constitution faces the change of society.  This camp is criticized, in that it allows 
 43. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 97 (Japan). The fundamental human 
rights by this constitution guaranteed to the people of japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of 
man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred 
upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.
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Constitutional suicide.44  The concept of natural law must be maintained.45
　 The other camp is for limits of Constitutional amendment.  The constituent 
power is higher than the power to amend the Constitution, and cannot change 
basic principles such as people’s sovereignty.  The list of fundamental rights is 
based on dignity of the human, which is the root idea of the Constitution.  Natural 
law holds that natural rights are given, including the inalienable right of life, 
liberty, and pursuit of happiness.  Natural law sets limits on the power to amend 
the Constitution.
　 Legal positivists also think that the power to amend the Constitution is 
organized in Constitutional provisions.  Fundamental change that loses identity is 
not permitted.  Only deletions, additions, and corrections are permissible.46 
4.  Essence of Power to Amend the Japanese Constitution
　 Two leading professors of Japanese constitutional law have explained the 
essence of amendment to the Japanese Constitution.  According to Sato Koji,47 
there are three approaches to understanding the constituent power.  First, the 
power to amend the Constitution is the same as the legislative power.  Second, the 
power to amend Constitution is as same as constituent power, but not identical. 
The amendment provision of Article 96 has a legal norm that controls power after 
establishment of the Japanese Constitution.  The power to amend the Constitution 
is a legally institutionalized power to establish a Constitution.48
　 Third, the power to amend the Constitution is new power that is not identical to 
constituent power.  The power to amend the Constitution is a new legal power, 
through which the power to establish a Constitution is organized.
　 Sato denies the second approach, because if the power to amend the 
Constitution is identical to the power to establish the Constitution, the legal nature 
of the provisions of Article 96 is denied.  Sato recommends the third approach, but 
is criticized as follows.  According to Sato, once the amendment proposal begins, 
there are two kinds of people: people in constituent power, and people amending 
the Constitution.  It is meaningless to tell one from another, and too technical an 
exercise to categorize a new third power.
　 Ashibe took Sato’s second approach and concluded as follows:49
　 The “people’s sovereignty” is the principle that we the people decide the 
 44. Supra note 35, at 386.
 45. Bernard Inagaki, The Constitution Of Japan And The Natural Law (Washington D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), 9―15.
 46. Ashibe Nobuyoshi, Kenpo Seitei Kenryoku, [The Power to Establish Constitution] 
(Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1983), 89―101.
 47. Sato Koji, Kenpo, [Constitution] (Seibundo, 2011), 38―41.
 48. Nonaka, Etl, Kenpo I, [Constitutional Law] (Yuhikaku, 2012), 23.
 49. Supra note 35, at 387.
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politics of the nation.  The Japanese Constitution provides for a representative 
democracy, and its legitimacy as a democracy is derived from the people.  The 
ultimate power to decide politics is to establish a Constitution.  The power to 
establish a Constitution is grounded in the people’s sovereignty.  Once a 
Constitution is established, the power to establish Constitution is frozen into the 
Constitution itself.  The power to amend the Constitution is legally organized 
within it, as in the amendment provision Article 96.  The opportunity for 
legitimacy and power is combined, not separated from each other.  After the 
Constitution is established, the people’s sovereignty functions only in context of 
legitimacy.  The only exception is that power works only through the provisions 
of Article 96.  The power to amend the Constitution is Constitutionally 
institutionalized legal power.
　 After the development of these two perspectives,50 various theories continued 
to evolve.  Both Sato and Ashibe believe that change in sovereignty is not 
permissible, as it is not allowed to change the amendment provision, Article 96. 
The amendment procedure is only way to legally amend the Constitution, and the 
rules of conduct.
V:  Change to the Japanese Constitution
1.  Change of Japanese Constitution
　 Most leaders of the LDP have intentionally not put issues of amendment and 
Article 9 on the party’s political agenda, according to Higuchi Yoichi.51
　 “Change of Japanese Constitution” is defined as change to the meaning of the 
text in the Japanese Constitution without amendment procedure, by statutes, court 
decision, action by the house of the Diet, Cabinet, and other changes in 
circumstances that alter the essential meaning of provisions, making them 
different from the original.52
　 One Japanese constitutional researcher,53 who studies Bruce Ackerman at Yale, 
thinks this change without amendment needs to be reviewed if changes in 
 50. Before Ashibe’s analysis, See. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Zentei Kenpou [Constitutional 
Law] (Nihonhyouronnsha, 2012), 785, 788.
 51. Higuchi Youichi, Ima Kenpo Kaisei Wo Dou Kangaeruka, [How Consider Amdnement 
of Constituion Today] (Iwanamishoten, 2013), 57, 59.
 52. Hashimoto Kiminobu, Nihonkoku Kenpo, [Constituon Of Japan] (Yuhikaku, 1980), 44―
45, 438―40.
  Ashibe Nobuyoshi, Kenpo Seitei Kenryoku, [The Power to Establish Constitution]
(Tokyodaigaku Shuppankai, 1983), 142―8.
 53. Ooe Ippei, “Ackerman No Nigenteki Minshusei Riron” [A Study of B. Ackerman’s 
Dualist Democracy], Kansai University Law Journal, 50 (2001―2): 177.
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Japanese constitutional politics occurs.  Otherwise, informal amendment of 
Japanese Constitution is permitted.
　 Some Japanese constitutional researchers divide change into two types: 
ordinary change and Article 9 change.
　 Ordinary change is defined as governmental action beyond a certain norm of 
the Constitution, which lost normative validity and effectiveness.
　 With regard to Article 9 change, drastic change in Japan’s status in international 
society requires change in the interpretation of Article 9.  Second, the normative 
viewpoint of the Japanese general public has changed, gravitating towards 
approval of self-defense forces.
　 The difference between ordinary change and that of Article 9 is that the latter 
shifts the scope of interpretation limit, depending on circumstances, such as the 
intensification of the Cold War, or the occurrence of Korean War.  Under the 
current international situation, the denial of self-defense power is not permissible. 
Japan now has a more participatory role in international society, which requires it 
to have its own self-defense force.
　 In the current context, Constitutional change without amendment appears to be 
an issue of recognition.54  International society needs not only European, but Asian 
countries, as well, today.  Japanese people support self-defense forces used for 
natural disasters, to save vulnerable people; this is not the original mission of the 
self-defense force, however.55
　 The criterion of change is not clearly fixed, and it should be subject to the 
process of Japanese amendment.56
VI:  Pre-commitment Constitution
　 The U.S. Constitution has certain limits for its amendment.  First, the equal 
voting right in the Senate is taken away without the consent of the State under 
Article 5.  Second, Clauses 1 and 4, Section 1 in Article 1 may not be modified.57 
The U.S. constitutional law scholars believe that this prohibits undemocratic 
amendment
1.  The Hand of the Dead in Japan
　 It is said that the Japanese Constitution was established and has still been 
 54. Ashibe Nobuyoshi, Kenpo-Gaku, [Study of Constitution] (Yuhikaku, 1992), 220―49.
 55. Okudaira Yasuhito, Kenpo Wo Ikiru, [Living in Constitution] (Nihonhyoronsha, 2007), 
168―70.
 56. Supra Note 47, at 41―44.
 57. Daniel Farber, Lincoln Constitution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 
144.
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controlled by dead people.  Professor Matsui Shigenori, who studied under 
Professor John Ely, clarifies that the Japanese Constitution is a process of the 
government, not a list of the fundamental rights.58
　 The Japanese Constitution has adopted a self-restraint concept called pre-
commitment.59  The Japanese people decide and control their destiny by 
themselves, but may fail in some cases.  The Japanese Constitution should work 
to bind people’s own ultimate power.  Japanese people must adopt mid-and long-
term perspectives, accepting that humans make mistakes.  The government 
established by the people may work in arbitrary and capricious ways.  The 
fundamental rights listed in the Constitution are basic principles intended to 
protect from governmental infringements.
VII:  Supremacy of the Law
1.  Who is the Supreme Interpreter
　 Abe once noted that he was the final and supreme interpreter of the Japanese 
Constitution,60 and he left a good lesson for constitutional studies.  If the Japanese 
Constitution is for Japanese people, every citizen can interpret its provisions, and 
Abe can freely interpret as a private citizen.  The interpretation by public officials 
is different from that of the general public, however.  Article 9961 stipulates that 
public officials shall maintain order under the Japanese Constitution.  The Prime 
Minister is not obligated to review whether his own power infringes the 
Constitution.  The Constitution binds an official’s exercise of power delegated by 
the people.  Officials in executive branches are required to observe the command 
from higher branches, unless it is clearly un-constitutional.
　  The widest scope of interpretation is allowed to judges in the judiciary.62  The 
narrowest is the Emperor, who is the symbol of the Japanese people63 and who has 
no political power.
 58. Matsui Shigenori, Nihonkokukenpo, [Japanese Constitution] (Yuhikaku, 2007).
 59. Sakaguchi Shojiro, Rikkennshugi To Minshushugi, [Constitutionalism and Democracy] 
(Nihonhyoronsha, 2007).
 60. February 14, 2014. At budget committee of the house of representative.
 61. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 99 (Japan). The Emperor or the Regent 
as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have 
the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.
 62. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 76(3) (Japan). All judges shall be 
independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution 
and the laws.
 63. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Constitution] Art. 1 (Japan). The Emperor shall be the 
symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the 
people with whom resides sovereign power.
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　 Japanese courts are expected to fill the gap between the general public and the 
text of Constitution, as do U.S. judges.  Unlike the U.S. federal and state judiciary, 
however, Japanese judges in inferior courts are not chosen by voting, but 
appointed by the Cabinet after training at the Legal Training and Research 
Institute of the judiciary.
Conclusion: The duty of the Constitutional Law Scholar
　 It is incorrect to say that it is difficult to amend the Japanese Constitution, and 
easy to amend the U.S. Constitution, as the current comparative review shows.
　 The U.S. President has veto power over the Congress for statutes, but not for 
the Constitutional amendment.  The federal and state legislature are exclusively 
engaged; and the U.S. president cannot dissolve the legislative bodies.
　 In Japan, a bill to amend the Japanese Constitution must be submitted by each 
house of the Diet.  The Japanese Constitution does not have a federalism system. 
Chapter 8 recently provided for the autonomy of local governments in the 
Japanese Constitution.  The Cabinet is eligible to submit a bill for statutes, but 
local government has no role in amending the Constitution except under Article 
95.  Under the Japanese Constitution, there is dissolution of the House of 
Representatives under the parliamentary system.  Japanese constitutional 
researchers think it is necessary to dissolve the Diet to ask the will of the people in 
cases where the issues were not reviewed by the people when the representatives 
are elected.
　 It is not simple to compare these two different systems.  One common 
characteristic is that election by the people is the base of democracy, and people 
vote to show their wills.  As a difference between the two, under Japan’s 
parliamentary system, the Cabinet has exercised the power to dissolve the 
parliament under Article 7.
　 Does Japan struggle with the amendment of its Constitution, compared with 
the U.S.?  The Japanese Constitution lists fundamental rights in Articles 10 to 40 
and is understood to limit and protect against the arbitrary and capricious exercise 
of power, creating a system of government called Constitutionalism.  The people’s 
sovereignty is the principle that the people decide and accept their governing 
decisions, even though they may be found to be wrong in the long run, bound by 
Constitution.  The decisions rendered by the courts are also a part of law, binding 
the judges as case law, as the rule of law.
　 The supreme power to interpret the Constitution is not with the Cabinet, but 
with the Japanese Supreme Court.  Public announcements by the CBL must work 
objectively in the long term and are not subject to political power.  The Japanese 
Supreme Court is expected to send messages through its decisions to gain the 
confidence of the people, bridging the gap between the judiciary and the general 
public.
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 37 / 201570
　 Japanese Constitutional scholars have often been asked if they have cultivated 
discussions on amendments to the Constitution.  This is something that only 
Japanese Constitutional scholars can do in order to bridge the gap between the 
public and the Constitution.
